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TOBIAS RAUN
Trans as Contested 
Intelligibility
Interrogating how to Conduct Trans Analysis 
with Respectful Curiosity
I ADMIT IT. Okay, there it is: I admit that this article grows out of 
being annoyed with the ways in which trans1 identities and narratives 
have been, and still to a certain extent are, conceptualized and analyzed. 
And I admit that this annoyance is informed by my own positionality 
as a trans male identified researcher, who conducts research under the 
banner of transgender studies. ”Trans” is thus a category or a label that 
I am inscribed and invested in, in many and intersecting ways. Or put 
differently, trans is a ”sticky” sign saturated with affects (Ahmed 2004) 
for me as a person and as a researcher. However, as I will argue, this 
is not just the case for me, but for many gender studies scholars. This 
became apparent to me while I was conducting my virtual ethnographic 
studies on audiovisual trans storytelling in video blogs on YouTube (see 
Raun 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2014), which let me to read and inter-
rogate what has been written about trans identities/narratives within 
primarily gender studies. What I experienced in my reading, as well as 
through my virtual ethnographic studies, was that trans circulates as a 
particularly contested intelligibility, and as a site of personal, social, and 
theoretical tension.
Historically trans people have been (and still is in many countries) 
pathologized within a psycho-medical discourse/establishment, and 
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have been ”dirty little outcasts of feminist and gay liberation discourses” 
(Stryker 2006a, 12). The claim has (among others) been that trans peo-
ple are antifeminist, reproducing a rigid, stereotypical, and normative 
gender ideology/system that stands in the way of social change (Ray-
mond 1979; Shapiro 1991), while gender-reassignment surgeries have 
been described as genital and bodily mutilation (Jeffreys 2005), caused 
by internalized homophobia (Jeffreys 2003, 137). Although one might 
say that this represents more historical views, they are not restricted to 
the past. In my experience (not least in a Nordic context) it is not un-
common to find different variations of these views both among the gen-
eral public and among researchers, some of which even claim to speak 
from an unspecified feminist position. While it might be obvious for 
the readers of lambda nordica why I find these statements annoying, it 
might be less clear why I object to some of the readings that have been 
conducted by queer theoretically informed scholars. Taking my point of 
departure in three more recent studies on trans life-stories conducted by 
Katherine Johnson, Dag Heede, and Jodi Kaufmann, I want to pause on 
and explore what hopes and fears ”sticks” to, or gets ”stuck” in relation 
to trans as a category. What kind of promises are attached to trans – and 
what kind of ideologies of social change are invested in, and expected to 
be carried by, trans identities?
Taking into account that queer theory ”remains the most hospitable 
place to undertake transgender work” (Stryker 2004, 214); it seems cru-
cial to dwell on the actual analysis that has been conducted from a queer 
perspective. No doubt queer theory has played (and continues to play) 
an important role in shedding light on and revalorizing trans practices 
and identities, and has contributed extensively to a problematization of 
the relation between biological sex and gender identification, as well 
as pinpointing sex itself as a discursively informed construction (Butler 
1990; 1993). But the premises for these endeavors are not always without 
a hitch, as I will argue.
I have chosen Johnson, Heede and Kaufmann as examples of what 
I see as widespread and problematic trends within some queer reading 
practices, studying trans life-story narratives. As examples they con-
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dense and point out some of the fundamental issues that I want to ad-
dress: Who is given voice and agency in the reading? What or who has 
to be revealed or deconstructed – and for whose sake? I will argue that 
Johnson, Heede and Kaufmann first and foremost are using the trans 
life-story narrative to ”expose” heteronormative structures, which in all 
three cases (yet in different ways) results in an instrumentalized and 
truncated reading of trans. This forecloses a more complex and diverse 
understanding of trans and fails to include a critical reflection about 
who gets to speak for trans identity.
This leads me to my second disclaimer, thus this article does not just 
grow out of annoyance, but also out of a lived experience of being ”re-
oriented” or ”redirected,” going through a social and medical transition, 
which made me extraordinarily aware of, and sensitive to, the politics 
of location and situated knowledges (Ahmed 2006, 5, 19–20). It is one 
thing to read about and cognitively understand cyberfeminist Donna 
Haraway’s claim that all scientific knowledge is situated and that all 
vision is embodied and yet another to experience that this is the case. 
To experience how one leaves a different impression on the world and 
how the world impress differently upon one. As affect and queer studies 
scholar Sara Ahmed touches upon but leaves unfolded: ”Bodily trans-
formations might transform what is experienced as delightful. If our 
bodies change over time, then the world around us will create different 
impressions.” (Ahmed 2010, 23) Now, I am not implying that going 
through a social and medical transition necessarily makes one a hyper 
aware human being, but it certainly has literalized within a fairly short 
span of time how my perceptions of the world are framed by my em-
bodied and intersubjective self – and how that coproduce what I am 
oriented towards and what is experienced as ”happy objects” to speak 
with Ahmed. And this effects how I conduct my research and what kind 
of analyzes I produce. I see things from more multiple and yet differ-
ent and marked positions than I did or was capable of, before, making 
me sympathetic towards, but also slightly weary of some of my own 
previous readings. To speak with Haraway, ”site” (location) and ”sight” 
(vision) are closely connected and to position oneself and be aware from 
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where one speaks/sees might be what paradoxically promises objectivity 
in research practice. As Haraway writes:
The moral is simple: only partial perspective promises objective vision 
[…]. All Western cultural narratives about objectivity are allegories of the 
ideologies of the relations of what we call mind and body, of distance and 
responsibility, embedded in the science question in feminism. Feminist 
objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge, not about 
transcendence and splitting of subject and object. (Haraway 1988, 583)
In line with the feminist epistemology of Donna Haraway, as well as 
transgender studies, I call for more studies with lived experiences as 
the focal point, acknowledging research as a ”view from a body”, even 
if that body is ”a complex, contradictory, structuring, and structured 
body” (Haraway 1988, 589). I also call for ambivalent reading strategies 
that attempt to move beyond what I would call ”dissecting” readings of 
personal trans narratives. I encourage readings where trans narratives/
identities are not reduced to a matter of normative (re)production and/or 
subversive deconstruction. Or put differently, I want to problematize the 
epistemological output of and the methodological premises for certain 
types of queer analysis where questions of normativity and subversion 
often seem to be both the scope and the conclusion. This pursuit often 
seems to be propelled by a declared wish to conduct ”critical” research. 
But the question is what becomes recognizable as critical research – and 
if the researcher can conduct the same kind of critical analysis on trans 
life-story narratives as on institutionalized homophobia or transphobia? 
I think these theoretical and methodological questions are important to 
raise in a Nordic context where they are rarely discussed at length on a 
scholarly level, perhaps because trans as a field of study is still fairly new.
Instrumentalizing Trans Life-Stories
Katherine Johnson is a British researcher working within the field of 
psychology and social science. Her article ”Changing Sex, Changing 
Self: Theorizing Transitions in Embodied Subjectivity”, is an attempt 
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to theorize transsexual subjectivity and embodiment (Johnson 2007, 54) 
by using and referencing queer poststructuralist thinkers such as Michel 
Foucault, Judith Jack Halberstam, and Judith Butler. The overall aim is 
to explore themes related to shifts in self-perceptions, in light of radical 
changes in gender presentation, among a group of FTMs and MTFs 
she has interviewed (Johnson 2007, 55). When I initially came across 
the article I was thrilled, however reading the article left me with a lot 
of methodological questions and concerns. The article made me criti-
cally reflect on how researchers approach personal trans narratives, and 
explicitly or implicitly inscribe themselves in the analysis.
Johnson introduces several interviewees, but very few of them are 
given more than a couple of lines of presentation. From the interviews 
Johnson elicits two ”constructions of selfhood”, namely ”being the same 
person” and ”being a new person” (Johnson 2007, 56). Billy (a FTM, 
age forty-six) is initially cast as a representative of the self-perception of 
being the same person, while Caroline (a MTF, age twenty-nine) is a 
representative for those who self-identify as being a new person. The two 
of them are analytically constructed as schematically and coherent exam-
ples of one and the other, which then becomes a point of reference from 
which to ”expose” the paradoxes in each narrative. As Johnson states: 
Despite Caroline’s essentialist claim to have a ”female brain,” she 
acknowledges that the successful manifestation of a gender identity is 
formulated through an ability to embody cultural practices of that gen-
der: through learning and performing what it is to be a woman or man. 
(Johnson 2007, 64)
Johnson questions and contests the stories in various ways. As she ar-
gues:
Billy is not the same person doing the same thing. Being related to as 
a man and relating to others as a man, rather than as a woman, will 
inevitably affect his gender subjectivity. It is, after all, the reason for 
transitioning. (Johnson 2007, 57)
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Not only does Johnson reject Billy’s reluctance to identify with having 
changed gender subjectivity, but she also criticizes Caroline for actually 
fully identifying with being a new person. The concluding argument is 
that ”for psychic health, it must be important to both accept and play 
with the inconsistencies in our self-narratives rather than attempting 
to merely iron out the creases” (Johnson 2007, 68). What seems to be 
neglected (even though it is the stated purpose of the article) is an analy-
sis of the individual renegotiation of self and body, or why one of the 
tropes is used (maybe strategically) or feels right, and not the other. To 
explore what function these different narratives serve in these people’s 
life-projects would not only be analytically interesting, but also allow 
for the individual story ”to breathe.” 2 This analytical strategy would also 
have made room for a certain degree of identification with the subjects, 
but that possibility is closed down by Johnson’s reading. It strikes me 
that Johnson ”others” the trans interviewees and specifically disidenti-
fies herself with them, and assumes that the reader does the same. As 
Johnson states: ”We might all feel that we are ’changing as a person,’ 
but […] she [Caroline] uses it to acknowledge a radical separation from 
her previous male gender identity.” (Johnson 2007, 63) This ”othering” 
is repeated several times, even when kinship is assumed: ”[T]he trans-
sexual subject is entrenched in the very same process as all of us: striving 
for the effect of ’realness.’” (Johnson 2007, 65, my emphasis in all of the 
above) Carolyn is here singled out as the transsexual subject, which not 
only makes her a representative of some sort of rare species, but also 
distinguishes her from a general, normative and naturalized majority of 
non-trans ”we” and ”us.” 
In conclusion, Johnson’s analysis is predominantly based on detecting, 
mapping, and revealing the gaps and contradictions in the stories being 
told. This is enhanced by the continuous and outspoken evaluations of 
the narratives and embodiments of the trans subjects.
What I would have wanted Johnson to do was to engage in analysis as 
somewhat of a dialogical interaction. A dialogical interpretative practice 
is informed by, and imbued with, ethical reflections, and entails that 
the researcher ”takes particular interest in learning from the storytellers” 
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and not to finalize the story or the storyteller (Frank 2010, 17, 20, em-
phasis in original). The premise is (though often temporarily forgotten) 
that no one – and this includes the researcher – has the whole story. 
This is in line with some of the requests and contributions offered by 
transgender studies, acknowledging ”the embodied experience of the 
speaking subject” as an important and essential component of the anal-
ysis of trans phenomena (Stryker 2006a, 12). Furthermore, a stronger 
focus on Johnson’s own biases could have contributed fruitfully to the 
analysis of the relationship between a story, a storyteller and a listener/
researcher, heightening the awareness of ”how each allows the other to be” 
(Frank 2010, 16, emphasis in original). I find it relevant to bear in mind 
transgender studies scholar Henry Rubin’s caution, given in connection 
with an interpretation of qualitative interviews touching on identity and 
embodiment among transsexual men:
We [researchers] must ask ourselves what it means that individuals 
feel like they have a ”true self,” even if we accept the idea that (gender) 
identities are fictionalized constructs of our collective imagination. We 
should be wary of simple attempts to dismiss all experience as false 
consciousness. (Rubin 2003, 12)
Relying on Exposure and Subversion
Dag Heede is a Danish researcher working within queer literary analy-
sis and theory. His article ”From ’a real girl’ to ’a pregnant man’ ” 3 takes 
its point of departure in two written trans autobiographies; the Danish 
Lili Elbe’s Man into Women (1931) and American Thomas Beatie’s La-
bor of Love (2008)4 to discuss notions of (trans)gender and reproduction. 
However, Man into Women is only partially an autobiography and can 
maybe more correctly be characterized as a ”hybrid text”, and as a ”writ-
ing collaboration” between Elbe and the editor Niels Hoyer, as Scandi-
navian studies researcher Sabine Meyer discusses (Meyer 2011, 70).
Dag Heede has published other and extended readings of Elbe’s book 
elsewhere, e.g. in the Swedish anthology, Queera läsningar [Queer Read-
ings] from 2012. The article ”From ’a real girl’ to ’a pregnant man’” is not 
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presented as a queer theoretical reading per se; in fact, it seems rather 
up in air what theoretical and methodological ”gaze” governs the read-
ing. References are made to queer theoretical scholars like Don Kulick 
and Michael Warner, to the deconstructive thinker Jacques Derrida, but 
most of all to the Foucauldian feminist Bernice Hausman’s work. Haus-
man has in critical terms theorized trans people’s ”dependence” on med-
ical technology as a submission to a patriarchal and capitalist industry 
(Hausman 1995). Hausman’s work has later been widely critiqued with-
in transgender studies and from feminist philosopher Cressida Heyes, 
who argues that Hausman erases the agency and critical awareness of 
trans people (Heyes 2007, 39). This critique is however not present in 
Heede’s presentation and use of Hausman.
Heede’s article is based on a reading of Elbe and Beatie’s claim of 
identity as ”overstated and radically non-subversive” (Heede 2012, 14). 
Heede’s prime conclusion is that both of these autobiographies articu-
late ”ultra-conservative gender stereotypes” and ”rigid heteronorma-
tivity”, and both books are described as being overtly preoccupied with 
renouncing the category of the monster and instead holding on to ”es-
sentialism” and ”(hyper) conventionalism” (Heede 2012, 14). I want 
to pause on the short analysis of Labor of Love that leads Heede to 
come to these conclusions. What is of special interest to me is the way 
Heede interprets Beatie’s pregnancy. According to Heede the book is 
”devoid of philosophical and reflective passages” and ”far less refined” 
than Man into Women (Heede 2012, 21). In other words the book is 
subjected to a value judgment, which might help explain why Heede 
does not leave room for a more nuanced and complex reading of the 
trans life-story narrative. Instead Heede seems preoccupied with ”re-
vealing” how Beatie constantly constructs himself as exclusively male. 
Beatie is according to Heede subscribing to the unambiguous category 
of man, husband and father. Beatie’s male identity and his pregnancy 
therefore constitute, in Heede’s interpretation, a ”fundamental con-
flict”. As illustration, Heede quotes the following passage from Labor 
of Love:
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I was not switching back to being a female; I was still, in my mind, fully 
male. I’ve always felt that the desire to have a child is neither a male nor 
a female desire – it is a human one. So why not carry the child as a male? 
Why couldn’t I be a pregnant man? (Heede 2012, 22) 
I am wondering if the quote necessarily points to a ”fundamental con-
flict” – and if so, is it a conflict in Beatie, or one imposed upon him by 
others? How can Heede ”know” that Beatie is expressing an internal 
conflict, and not just being in discussion with societal norms about what 
male bodies are supposed to do and not do? In any case, Beatie seems to 
present a questioning of male pregnancy as an oxymoron. He is asking 
why carrying a baby per se is considered a feminizing act, thus trying to 
reformulate the assumed causal connection between certain (reproduc-
tive) bodily capacities and their gendered signifier. Read in this light, 
Beatie is not reproducing heteronormativity, but rather renegotiating 
what fatherhood could involve. Furthermore, it surprises me that Heede 
insist on labeling Beatie’s capacity to carry children as having kept his 
”female reproductive organs” (Heede 2012, 21). How come that these 
organs have to be labeled ”female”? Remembering Butler’s problemati-
zation of the naturalization of sex, I am puzzled by Heede’s reduction 
of body parts and organs to stabile gendered positions. As Butler taught 
us, we should pay more attention to the language used and to our la-
beling of body parts/ functions, as these are performative iterations 
that (re)create the things and categories they are meant just to describe. 
One might say that to be aware of the power of language is especially 
important in the case of trans, as trans bodies are often not reducible to 
non-trans characterizations, either because these bodies look different 
or because individual trans people perceive and identify their bodies 
very differently, often relabeling body parts, or inventing new labels that 
seems more adequate.
On the one hand Heede distance himself from ”trans phobic streams 
of 1970s feminism” (e.g., Janice Raymond), and highlights their disre-
spectful labeling of trans women as ”she-males” (Heede 2007, 13). But 
on the other hand Heede himself nevertheless seems a bit careless with 
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his wordings, as he characterizes genital surgery for trans men as ”an ar-
tificial penis” (Heede 2007, 21). Such pronouncements also run through 
Katherine Johnson’s text, as she calls it a ”penis-like construction”. Both 
Heede and Johnson agree that trans male genital surgeries are so com-
plicated and of such a poor quality that few opt for them. This, according 
to Johnson, ”leaves the trans-man in the incongruous position of at-
tempting to be a man with a vagina.” (Johnson 2007, 66) Johnson is here 
implying that trans men are failed men by describing the phalloplasty5-
operated trans man as having not a penis, but a ”penis-like construc-
tion” and the non-operated trans man as ”attempting to be a man with 
a vagina”. However, as the new book Hung Jury: Testimonies of Genital 
Surgery by Transsexual Men shows, statements like Heede and Johnsons 
are false and misleading (but unfortunately common), perpetuating ”the 
myth that FTM genital surgery is unsuccessful and produces aestheti-
cally poor, nonfunctioning penises” (Cotten 2012, 3). The information 
on both phalloplasty and metoidioplasty has been either sparse or paint-
ing a misleading and negative picture whether that is in mainstream 
media or scholarly work. But maybe more importantly, statements like 
Heede and Johnsons ”also imply that trans men’s genitalia are inauthen-
tic second-hand replicas of cis-gender men’s penises which are implicitly 
taken as the standard of measurement” (Cotten 2012, 3). The time gap 
between Cotten’s work (2012) and Johnson’s (2007) might explain the 
lack of knowledge, but to perpetuate negative (if not directly wrong) 
notions are nevertheless problematic. Besides one might ask to what de-
gree these penises are ”artificial” as Heede notes, as body tissue is being 
used to create them. Furthermore, it seems absurd to rely on some form 
of queer perspective and then denote only some gender expressions to be 
”artificial” or ”constructions,” and not all.
Which Trans Subject Is Recognized as Subversive?
I want to return now to Beatie’s disavowal of the category of the mon-
ster, which leads Heede to conclude that Labor of Love insistently tries 
to ”normalize and dedemonize the project of the small nuclear family” 
(Heede 2012, 23). I am not denying that Beatie expresses an investment 
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in being included in certain definitions of normality, especially around 
couplehood and having children. But I am wondering why this seems 
to be an a priori heteronormative act whereas taking on the image of 
the monster is de facto subversive. I would argue that the interesting 
question is not whether individual claims of identity are normative/sub-
versive or not – but how and why it seems more urgent for (some) trans 
people to disavow the category of the monster, and to claim recogni-
tion within culturally established categories. A possible answer is that 
”monster” is always already the circulating trope of intelligibility that 
”sticks” to trans people,6 and it might therefore come as no surprise that 
many trans people try to negotiate and invoke other categories as self-
identificatory labels. One might say that Beatie in particular, as one of 
the first pregnant men to go public, has been offered nothing but the 
category of the ”freak”/”monster” in newspaper headlines. When being 
so overtly determined from the outside as a monster, monster might not 
be a particularly wanted or ”subversive” category to take on. This does 
not necessarily make trans people like Beatie essentialists, but points to 
a greater vulnerability concerning de-humanization and misrecognition.
But more importantly, how come questions of normativity and sub-
version are both the scope and the conclusion of Heede’s analysis? Not 
only does an exclusive focus on subversive/normative claims of identity 
repeat and reduce trans to a personal identity issue, but it also forecloses 
a discussion of the cisgender contexts that trans people like Beatie must 
negotiate and maneuver – and how that sets the scene for the claims he 
is able and unable to make. Beatie’s divorce in 2012 from his wife Nancy 
is a case in point that brings up the importance of legal rights and repro-
ductive rights for trans people as the questions regarding what counts as 
a sex-change surgery (and where) became crucial in determining Beatie’s 
right to divorce, to get custody over the children, and if and how much 
alimony he should pay. It would have been interesting if Heede (instead 
of assuming that we already know what heteronormativity is or looks 
like) had developed and rethought the concept of heteronormativity in 
connection with cissexism.7 This would have helped specify the bodily 
norms, and social and state institutionalized classification systems that 
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trans people to varying degrees and with various effects, fail to com-
ply with, and thereby become apparatuses of othering. To analytically 
explore these questions would also encourage a reflection of the actual 
contexts in which the problematic of identity occurs. As transgender 
studies scholar Vivianne Namaste points out, there is often ”little con-
cern for the individuals who live, work, and identify themselves as drag 
queens, transsexuals, or transgenderists” (Namaste 2000, 9), thus they 
appear as ”rhetorical figures” wherein ”the voices, struggles, and joys of 
real transgendered people in the everyday social world are noticeably 
absent” (Namaste 2000, 16).
It seems as if Heede has difficulty interpreting the pregnancy as any-
thing but part of a heteronormative project. Procreating within a house-
hold of two is often considered rather reactionary within queer streams 
of thought – and especially the child as a promise of the future has been 
subjected to queer critic (Edelman 2004). Although this could be at stake 
in Heede’s reading as well, it seems most of all to be Beatie’s identifica-
tion as a ”heterosexual man” that makes it difficult for Heede to attach 
any kind of subversive potential to Beatie’s trans identity. As transgender 
studies scholar Susan Stryker has argued several times, ”queer” does all 
too often become a code word for ”gay” or ”lesbian,” privileging sexual 
orientation and sexual identity and overlooking other ways of differing 
from heteronormativity (Stryker 2004, 214; 2006a, 7). I cannot help spec-
ulate about what gender expression and what sexual orientation/identity 
Beatie should have claimed and engaged in, in order for Heede to recog-
nize these as subversive. It seems fair to say that queer theory (and Heede 
in particular) tends to celebrate trans identity performances and practices 
that embrace ambivalence (or in Heede’s version, ”monstrosity”), or vari-
ous forms of transgression/crossings and/or sexual relations recognizable 
as non-heterogendered. However, queer theory has been more silent, or 
even critical toward trans identity performances or practices that seem 
more gender-conforming, or that have become recognized as reidealizing 
heterosexual relations. In other words, various forms of trans identifica-
tions and practices seem to possess a norm-breaking potential, as well as 
occupying the site where norms become reproduced.
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The linking of queer to ”the sexual” and the privileging of (certain) 
sexual practices and identities within queer theory have been raised and 
critiqued from different sides. Somatechnics scholars Nikki Sullivan 
and Samantha Murray state: 
It is this knotty association of queer with ”the sexual,” or more specifical-
ly, with sexual practices and identities conceived as counter-hegemonic 
that, in our opinion, limits some of the interventions practiced under the 
banner of queer. (Sullivan and Murray 2009, 4)
However, already in 1994, feminist and queer studies scholar Biddy 
Martin warned against ”the fear of being ordinary” in queer theory:
Having accepted the claim that interiorities and core gender identities 
are effects of normalizing, disciplinary mechanisms, many queer theo-
rists seem to think that gender identities are therefore only constraining, 
and can be overridden by the greater mobility of queer desires. (Martin 
1994, 102)
Martin encourages us to stop defining queerness as mobile and fluid, 
and to think critically about what then gets construed as stagnant and 
ensnaring (Martin 1994, 101). In line with Martin, I find it important to 
warn against creating a queer theoretical hierarchy or ”normativity,” and 
to assume in advance what to look for as normative or subversive. I also 
want to pinpoint the danger of celebrating mobility not just because of 
its class biases, but also because of its connection to current neoliberal 
trends.
I consider Heede’s analysis as an example of a stream of queer studies 
that concerns itself with exposing whether the performances and nar-
ratives of trans people are subversive/radical enough. Trans identities 
seem to inhabit an ambivalent position and be a vulnerable point within 
a lot of queer theoretical research, construed as both radically fluid and 
stagnant. This has also been a concern raised by Rubin, who argues that 
trans people have been criticized as ”gender traitors,” and celebrated as 
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”gender revolutionaries” (Rubin 2003, 163). Rubin has in various writ-
ings been critical toward what he calls trans people’s expectance to carry 
”the revolutionary burden of overthrowing gender or imagining what to 
replace it with” (Rubin 1998, 273). His critique is directed toward femi-
nist and queer studies he accuses of ”passing moral judgments on trans-
sexual subjects, who should somehow know better than to ’believe’ in 
gender (while letting nontranssexuals off the hook)” (Rubin 1998, 271). 
As far as I perceive it, two things are in play here: (1) an expectation 
that trans people enact (or should enact) a more ”queer” version of gen-
der and sexuality (whatever that means), and (2) an expectation that 
good research is critical and deconstructive. As queer and affect studies 
scholar Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick points out, many researchers rely on 
the power of unveiling, thus ”unveiling [has] become the common cur-
rency of cultural and historicist studies” (Sedgwick 2003, 143). She calls 
this a ”tracing-and-exposure project” that is ”widely understood as a 
mandatory injunction rather than a possibility among other possibilities” 
(Sedgwick 2003, 124–5). In Heede’s case this leads to an exclusive focus 
on revealing and/or subverting heteronormativity through analysis by 
pinpointing normative assumptions and/or drawing attention to ”trick-
sters.” However, this often result in an approach to the personal trans 
stories as ”a suspect text,” which ”uncannily mirrors that of the policing 
clinician who has gone before [her/him]: the critic catches us out in 
our duplicity” (Prosser 1998, 131). The researcher is implicitly casted as 
the knowledgeable subject who outsmarts the subjects being researched, 
misled and caught up as they are in their false consciousness. To reflect 
upon and to discuss the problematics of power relations between the 
researcher and the research subject is prevalent and ongoing within the 
social and behavioral sciences but are often absent within certain parts 
of the humanities, not least literary and art historical analysis.
Last, but not least; although I find it analytically unfruitful and po-
tentially harmful to let the pursuit of normativity/subversion be the 
main scope and conclusion of the analysis, I do find that Beatie’s narra-
tive is much more ambivalent than Heede allows it to be. What could 
indeed be more ”queer” than to hold on to categories like heterosexual 
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man and yet give birth to his own child? Is this not challenging how we 
understand the relation between bodily functions, gender identity and 
sexual orientation?
Trans Life-Stories on the Narratological Dissecting Table
Jodi Kaufmann is an US American queer/poststructuralist qualitative 
research methodologist. Her article ”Trans-representation” is a re-
reading of the trans woman Jessie’s narrative, generated in 2004 in a 
biographical interview (Kaufmann 2010, 105). Kaufmann precedes the 
article with telling the story about how she made Jessie cry after she 
read Kaufmann’s completed analysis of her narrative construction of 
gender. Jessie is quoted as saying: ”You have taken away the identity I 
have worked all my life to build . . . Who am I if you take this away?” 
(Kaufmann 2010, 104) This episode becomes a starting point for a criti-
cal self-reflection as Kaufmann realizes that the queer plot reduced Jes-
sie the person to a chain of signifying links, even though the intent was 
to bring ”light to how we (re)produce gender and the body within the 
heteronormative” (Kaufmann 2010, 112). As Kaufmann further states: 
”I realized the queer theoretical constructs on which I relied to represent 
Jessie might have functioned to deconstruct gender but did so at the cost 
of Jessie’s embodied experience.” (Kaufmann 2010, 104) Kaufmann re-
writes the article in an attempt to rethink how to avoid Jessie’s ”analytic 
erasure” (Kaufmann 2010, 104).
This rereading raises important and interesting methodological 
questions regarding the researcher’s representation of interviewees 
through different kinds of theoretical perspectives. It also raises the 
question: Is it necessary for the researcher to encourage feedback and 
dialogue about the analysis – and how important is it that the research-
er produces readings that the participants feel comfortable with and 
see themselves reflected in? Within feminist and activist knowledge 
production, as well as within the tradition of transgender studies, re-
search is not separated from but grows out of everyday practices and 
politics, and involves dialogue with the people involved. Studying trans 
people is a particularly contested field, taking into consideration the 
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long history of exploitive and harmful research done by non-trans peo-
ple. Trans theorist and performance artist Sandy Stone and transgender 
studies and philosophy scholar Jacob Hale’s ”Suggested Rules for Non-
Transsexuals Writing about Transsexuals, Transsexuality, Transsexu-
alism, or Trans” is a reminder of this history, but also a admonition to 
all researchers, trans or not, to engage with this field of study with a 
discerning mind and compassionate heart. Some of the key things that 
they point out are:
Interrogate your own subject position […]. [---] Don’t erase our voices 
by ignoring what we say and write […]. [---] Don’t totalize us, don’t rep-
resent us or our discourses as monolithic or univocal […]. [---] Be aware 
that if you judge us with reference to your political agenda (or agendas) 
taken as the measure or standard, […] that it’s equally legitimate (or 
illegitimate, as the case may be) for us to use our political agenda(s) as 
measures by which to judge you and your work. (Hale and Stone 1997)
What these suggested rules point out is both the importance of a nu-
anced representation that allows trans people to have a voice of their 
own, and the importance of the researcher to situate oneself.
Kaufmann’s rereading of Jessie’s story is performed through differ-
ent plots; the hermaphrodite plot, the misalignment plot, the queer plot 
(focusing on heterologic and homologic), and the material embodiment 
plot. These plots become tools for analytical framing, and yet they shove 
Jessie as a person and the socio-cultural problems that she faces into 
the background. Kaufmann starts out with the ”sex-gender misalign-
ment plot with a residue of a hermaphroditic plot” (Kaufmann 2010, 
106), which appears to give voice to Jessie’s authentic self, but this is ex-
actly the danger according to Kaufmann, because the heteronorms that 
saturate Jessie’s telling then become hidden (Kaufmann 2010, 112). The 
plot is also dismissed by Kaufmann as a medical narrative, the learned 
and rehearsed narrative that one should tell in order to receive medical 
help (Kaufmann 2010, 107). Then Kaufmann attends to the queer plot, 
which starts out with a long description of different arguments within 
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the field and examples of queer representations of transsexuals, which 
Kaufmann argues ”disrupts heteronormativity” (Kaufmann 2010, 108). 
Disruption was clearly Kaufmann’s analytical intention and strategy in 
her first reading of Jessie, and what made Jessie uncomfortable. How-
ever, Kaufmann reproduces an analysis supposedly similar to her initial 
one under the performative title ”Scene 3.” Here an excerpt from the 
interview appears, which she thoroughly dissects using the concepts of 
heterologic and homologic as scalpels. The stated goal of this reading is 
to illustrate ”not only that sex and gender are socially constructed but 
also how they are constructed to (re)produce heteronormativity” (Kauf-
mann 2010, 109–10). Kaufmann continues her plot reading by introduc-
ing the critique supplied by transgender studies of the way that queer 
theory ”ignores and erases the lived experiences and desires of many 
transsexuals” (Kaufmann 2010, 110). Reading Jessie’s story through ”the 
material embodiment plot” suggested by transgender studies entails in 
Kaufmann’s version a heavy use of quotes and hardly any analytical re-
flections. Kaufmann hereby suggests that paying attention to the voice 
of trans people themselves, annuls analytical reflection and contextual-
ization of what is being said, which is certainly not the case. Kaufmann 
uses the work of Bernice Hausman to conclude: ”It may be that all too 
easily theories of embodiment rely on simplistic notions of essentialism” 
as sexed embodiment is ”presented with the simplistic and highly prob-
lematic idea of true gender” (Kaufmann 2010, 112). As noted previously 
(in connection with Dag Heede), relying on Hausman might be prob-
lematic, considering that several trans researchers have dismissed Haus-
man’s research as transphobic (see, e.g., Prosser 1998; Stryker 2006a; 
Heyes 2007). 
It does not seem clear to me how these plots help save Jessie from 
”analytic erasure” as the stated purpose was, especially taking into con-
sideration that these plots contribute to a further dissection of the life-
story, and a further detachment from a living, breathing storyteller and 
the social and political issues present in Jessie’s life. Kaufmann’s read-
ing is, as I will argue, still primarily focused on revealing and map-
ping what she labels ”veiled ideologies and structures” (Kaufmann 2010, 
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114). The focus continues to be on detecting how Jessie’s narrative is 
implicated in heteronormative scripts and finding a representation that 
contributes to a disruption of heteronormativity. Tracking and map-
ping heteronormativity was initially an attempt to expose a regime of 
knowledge and social practice that Kaufmann saw as oppressing Jessie, 
constraining her from the possibility of living gender (Kaufmann 2010, 
114). The question is whether Kaufmann’s rereading ends up constrain-
ing Jessie as well. Although being a rereading, engaging self-reflexively 
with her own first reading, Kaufmann ends up reproducing yet again a 
dissection of Jessie’s narrative that analytically reduces Jessie’s voice to 
theoretical plots. Kaufmann’s reading (like some types of queer readings) 
can be criticized for not paying enough attention to trans as an actual 
embodied and lived subjectivity, subjected to specific juridical and social 
discrimination (Prosser 1998; Namaste 2000; Rubin 2003). As Henry 
Rubin argues, too strong a focus on discursive constructions can eas-
ily end up neglecting embodied experience, invalidating the categories 
through which the subject makes sense of their experiences (Rubin 1998, 
265). Jay Prosser has emphasized embodiment as a topic that he finds to 
be specifically overlooked within queer theory’s study on trans issues, 
using the term ”desomatization” to describe this neglect (Prosser 1998, 
66). Or one might, in the words of Raewyn Connell, argue that Kauf-
mann’s strict focus on ”a problematic of identity,” neglects to address 
the social issues of transition so present in trans women’s lives (work, 
poverty, state organizations of police, health, family services, and so on) 
(Connell 2012, 864–5).
Exit: Who Lets the Subaltern Speak – And How?
As I have argued, Johnson, Heede and Kaufmann do not situate them-
selves in their study, which have different and yet related effects for the 
analysis produced. Their readings reproduce a ”seeing everything from 
nowhere” (Haraway 1988, 581). To speak with Haraway, they parade as 
the all-seeing eye/I who acts as if their view is not situated and informed 
by the politics of location. In Kaufmann’s case, it is a self-reflective yet 
unmarked, disembodied nowhere. The apparently high degree of criti-
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cal reevaluation does not include a reflection about the power relation 
implicated in a (presumably) non-trans female researcher deconstruct-
ing the life-narrative and gendered self-perception of a trans woman. 
Likewise, Johnson only positions herself in the abstract ”we” (an as-
sumed non-trans position), and she does not reflect on the ethical and 
methodological implications of conducting research on trans people 
as a (presumably) non-trans person. Heede is not conducting inter-
views, which makes the ethical and methodological issues concerning 
researcher and informant/research subject slightly different. But the 
question is whether a text, written under the label of autobiography de-
serves another kind of reading than Karen Blixen’s short stories or H. C. 
Andersen’s fairytales (which Heede has previously written about)? Is it 
okay to conduct the same kind of playful literary analysis no matter the 
character and genre of the text? In any case, it is problematic to request 
that trans people take on the category of the monster/the monstrous 
without delimitating from what position such a request is posed – and 
whose cause that might serve.
According to Haraway unlocated knowledges are irresponsible in the 
sense that they are unable to be called into account (Haraway 1988, 583). 
To position oneself as a researcher is therefore to take responsibility for 
one’s ”enabling practices” (Haraway 1988, 587), that is to demarcate and 
share on what grounds knowledge is produced. Accountability and re-
sponsibility is important not least for when translating and communi-
cating ”the cacophonous visions and visionary voices that characterize 
the knowledge of the subjugated” (Haraway 1988, 590). Or the other 
way around; assuming to represent, and give voice to, subjugated knowl-
edges can also be dangerous, which the postcolonial theorist Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak pinpoints in ”Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1998). 
Here she warns that theoretical thinking (in her case Western, post-
colonial) that seeks to allow the subaltern to speak might unknowingly 
perform the same kind of dominance that it seeks to dismantle. As Spi-
vak states, radical criticism ”gives an illusion of undermining subjective 
sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge” 
(Spivak 1998, 24). She acknowledges the attempt to undo the ”epistemic 
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violence” done upon (in her case Indian) subalterns, but doing it from 
the outside risks reproducing a dependency and power relation in which 
(Western) intellectuals ”speak for” the subaltern condition, rather than 
allowing them to speak for themselves. Or as Haraway puts it: ”But here 
there also lies a serious danger of romanticizing and/or appropriating 
the vision of the less powerful while claiming to see from their posi-
tions.” (Haraway 1988, 584)
The critique raised by transgender studies scholars like e.g. Rubin, 
Prosser, and Namaste pinpoints how the development of the theoretical 
concept of (gender) performance and performativity lacks a reflection 
of the actual contexts in which they occur and omits inclusion of trans 
people’s actual lives and political demands. This does not mean that 
the overall queer theoretical framework is necessarily in opposition to 
trans experiences or interests as such, but it needs to be developed fur-
ther to address the specificity of trans as a field of study. Butler’s later 
work Undoing Gender (2004) seems to be responding to, and warning 
against, some of the radical avant-garde readings produced under the 
banner of queer theory – some of which Butler herself has been accused 
of. However, I see these readings more present in activist and theo-
retical applications of Butler’s thinking, e.g. in Katherine Johnson, Dag 
Heede and Jodi Kaufmanns readings, than in her works themselves. As 
Butler makes clear, queer theory is not by definition opposing all iden-
tity claims, including stable sex (re)assignment, and ”more important 
than any presupposition about the plasticity of identity or indeed its 
retrograde status is queer theory’s claim to be opposed to the unwanted 
legislation of identity” (Butler 2004, 7). And Butler specifies in connec-
tion with trans identity claims: ”[T]he transsexual desire to become a 
man or a woman is not to be dismissed as a simple desire to conform to 
established identity categories.” (Butler 2004, 8) 
What I object to in Johnson, Heede and Kaufmanns analysis is 
that they have too truncated readings that foreclose ambiguities and 
equivocality. I therefore wish for more space in which each story and 
storyteller is allowed to breathe. This does not suspend or deny the 
reality or gravity of heteronormative oppression that queer theory is 
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often focused on, but it allows for less monolithic readings, where one 
does not know in advance what is to be recognized as normative and as 
subversive. The point of a queer theoretical analysis is, as Butler pointed 
out back in 1993, to keep queer ”a discursive site whose uses are not 
fully constrained in advance”, and to consider the exclusionary force of 
one’s analysis: ”Who is represented by which use of the term, and who 
is excluded?” (Butler 1993, 230, 227) Or, as Haraway state: ”We are 
also bound to seek perspective from these points of view, which can 
never be known in advance, that is, knowledge potent for constructing 
worlds less organized by axes of domination.” (Haraway 1988, 585) This 
is crucial if we as researchers are to keep the field of queer, trans and 
feminist studies alive as thought provoking perspectives that matter 
and claims social change.
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NOTeS
1. I refer to trans as an inclusive term encompassing claims of gender identity that 
involves a ”movement across a socially imposed boundary away from an unchosen starting 
place” (Stryker 2008a, 1, emphasis in original). I prefer the short version, ”trans,” 
because it does not have the pathologizing associations that ”transsexual” has and 
because it is more inclusive. However I also prefer trans to transgender because the 
term transgender profiles gender (and not sex) as the boundary that is crossed. 
2. To let stories breathe is an attitude inspired by the title of Professor of Sociology 
Arthur Frank’s book about socio-narratology. Frank labels his approach ”dialogi-
cal,” and opposes it to interpretive analysis based on ”decoding,” where the analyst 
is assigned the privilege to speak and ”reveal truths not readily accessible to those 
who see only appearances” (Frank 2010, 93–4). I will return to and elaborate on 
this throughout the article. 
3. My translation from the Danish titel ”Fra ’en rigtig pige’ til ’en gravid mand’– 
Transpersoner og reproduktion: Den sidste grænse?”.
4. Thomas Beatie has been sensationalized in tabloid headlines in 2008 as ”The Preg-
nant Man,” when he decided to carry his own children which his wife at the time 
was unable to do.
5. Phalloplasty is the construction of a (recognizable) penis by removing tissue from 
a donor site (another place on the body, typically on the arm or the thigh) and 
extending the urethra. Phalloplasty is not the only surgical solution, there is also 
metoidioplasty, that frees the already hormonally extended ”mini-penis” (also la-
beled clitoris/dickclit etc.) and makes it protrude more prominently from the groin 
area. Trystan Cotten has edited the first collection of testimonies of genital surgery 
for trans men (Cotten ed. 2012). 
6. It is rather telling that Susan Stryker has written a famous essay about the monster 
discussing trans identity and Victor Frankenstein. Here she reclaims a kinship with 
the monster – a kinship that has always already been appointed to her as a trans 
person. As she states: ”Like the monster, I am too often perceived as less than fully 
human due to the means of my embodiment.” (Stryker 2006b, 245)
7. Cissexism is the naturalization and authorization of the sex that one was assigned 
at birth as one’s real and proper gender. Likewise, the relation between sex and 
gender is assumed to be natural and unproblematic, making trans people’s sense of 
gender less authentic and legitimate as well as attributing trans people’s potential 
incoherence between sex and gender an individualized problem and/or disorder. 
This creates a huge disparity between trans and non-trans people, not least in 
relation to access to gender-related health care, which e.g. Julia Serano from a US 
point of view exemplifies as insurance companies’ coverage of hormone-replace-
ment therapy, genital and breast reconstruction, and procedures that enhance 
or enable fertility and sexuality for non-trans people, but not for trans people. 
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Furthermore non-trans people are neither being pathologised, nor require anyone 
else’s permission or approval for accessing gender-related health care or for having 
legal documents that reflect the gender one identifies as (Serano 2007, 157). Thus, 
there are different standards of legitimacy to people’s identified and lived genders 
based on whether one is non-trans or trans (Serano 2007, 168). Cissexism is also 
connected to cissexual assumption, which is analogous to heterosexual assump-
tion: one is assumed to be non-trans and fall naturally into the category of man 
or woman, making it impossible to be open about one’s trans status unless one 
continuously ”comes out” (Serano 2007, 164–5). Cissexual privilege is the gender 
entitlement and legitimacy that non-trans people are given and assume in their 
gender identification, which at times can also be extended to trans people when ad-
dressed in one’s chosen gender or being allowed into gender-segregated spaces that 
one feels one belongs in – restrooms, for example. But as Serano states: ”However, 
because I am a transsexual, the cissexual privilege that I experience is not equal to 
that of a cissexual because it can be brought into question at any time. It is perhaps 
best described as conditional cissexual privilege, because it can be taken away from 
me (and often is) as soon as I mention, or someone discovers, that I am transsexual.” 
(Serano 2007, 169)
SAMMENFATNING
Denne artikel rejser en række epistemologiske og metodologiske spørgsmål 
vedrørende læsningen af trans som identitetskategori. Disse spørgsmål er 
stærkt underbelyste i en skandinavisk akademisk kontekst, om end der el-
lers i stigende grad produceres analyser af trans identitetsnarrativer. Artiklen 
sætter fokus på, hvordan trans indrammes og betydningstilskrives indenfor 
visse former for queer teoretisk informerede læsninger. Gennem næranalyser 
af tre nyere tekster af henholdsvis Katherine Johnson, Dag Heede og Jodi 
Kaufmann påpeges farerne ved en alt for dissekerende læsning, da denne 
har tendens til at reducere trans til et spørgsmål om normativ (re)produktion 
eller subversiv dekonstruktion. Sluttelig argumenteres der for at (gen)besøge 
og ihukomme spørgsmålet om lokaliseringens politik som forsker og i den 
analytiske praksis; hvem taler og tildeles stemme – og på hvilke præmisser?
Keywords: methodology, epistemology, transgender studies, trans life-story 
narratives
